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Résumés
Français English 
Le présent article porte sur les commentaires de Jeremy Bentham en matière de goût et d’éthique. Il 
analyse les efforts des représentants du « radicalisme philosophique » (notamment John Bowring) au 
sein du Comité consultatif des Arts et des Manufactures de 1835/6 et montre comment ils ont cherché à 
appliquer l’utilitarisme aux questions relatives public taste. Cet épisode inattendu soulève des problèmes 
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d’éthique, de gouvernance et de pédagogie publique qui sont toujours d’actualité. Bentham avait élaboré 
une approche utilitariste du goût dans ses « Maximes relatives à la manière de transplanter les lois », où 
la correspondance entre les individus et les goûts était présentée comme une série d’affirmations 
contingentes au sein d’un système de signification. Une telle description est problématique car elle remet 
en cause  « les préjugés personnels formés par des intérêts sectaires » qui s’expriment par le biais 
d’appréciations de sympathie ou d’antipathie. Mon analyse des problèmes découlant de la volonté de 
Bentham de mettre les  ‘préjugés à part’ dans les discussions sur le goût, se fonde sur les analyses que 
fait Lacan de la ‘conversion utilitariste’. L’éloge que Lacan fait de Bentham et de sa ‘Théorie des 
Fictions’ sous-estime l’importance de l’éthique benthamienne, tout en interprétant de façon erronée 
certaines de ses caractéristiques les plus importantes.  Je soutiens que la façon dont Bentham traite les 
faits, plutôt que la fiction, permet une compréhension plus précise de la place de l’inconscient dans la 
pensée benthamienne, de même qu’une meilleure perception de la conscience utilitariste en matière de 
goût.
This article uses Jeremy Bentham’s comments on taste and ethics to analyse the efforts of ‘Philosophical 
Radical’ members of the Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures of 1835/6, including Bentham’s 
executor and editor John Bowring, to apply utilitarianism to questions of public taste. The application of 
utilitarian thinking to questions of public taste by Members of Parliament was an unlikely occurrence, 
but it raised problems of ethics, governance and public pedagogy that persist to this day.  Bentham had 
sketched out a utilitarian approach to public taste in his writing on ‘Rules Respecting the Method of 
Transplanting Laws’, where the correspondence between individuals and tastes is presented as a set of 
contingent statements within a signifying system.  However, the problem of describing taste as a set of 
contingent statements is that it challenges the ‘interest begotten prejudice’ that may be expressed in 
judgments of sympathy or antipathy.  My analysis of the problems attending Bentham’s wish to set 
‘prejudice apart’ in discussions of taste, is undertaken with specific reference to the psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan’s emphasis on the importance of what he termed ‘the utilitarian conversion’ in ethics. 
 Lacan’s praise for Bentham and the ‘Theory of Fictions’ demonstrates a limited insight into the 
importance of Bentham’s ethics, while misunderstanding some of its most important features.  I argue 
that Bentham’s treatment of fact, rather than fiction, gives us a more precise route to the place of the 
unconscious in Bentham’s thought, as well as a better understanding of a utilitarian consciousness of 
taste. 
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Bentham on Judicial Reform in Scotland. Profound-original-useless! unintelligible to common readers, 
and attacks all their prejudices. 
The London Literary Gazette July 25 1835
1: Introduction
1Facts have a central place in Bentham’s ethics. In Bentham and the Ethics of Today, David Baumgardt 
states plainly that ‘It is the very essence of the moral calculus to base moral valuations on a comparison 
of facts, and not on other valuations.’1 Baumgardt’s distinction between a comparison of facts and 
‘other valuations’, indicates that a utilitarian consciousness is primarily concerned with distinguishing 
facts from fallacies2within particular contexts for thinking and making statements (including statements 
about ethics) rather than separating fact from fiction, or fiction from an abstract reality.3  For Bentham, 
the term ‘fact’ indicates the shortest cognitive route from sensation to understanding, whereas fallacy 
produces an inhibition against, or a detour from, this path.  On the one hand, a moral calculus that ‘rests 
on fact - and appeals to sense’4 takes account of the pleasures that are actually experienced, rather than 
the pleasures that we are told to experience, or those that we are instructed to avoid. On the other hand, 
Bentham makes it equally plain that this calculating consciousness is often unconscious within the 
practice of everyday life. While we may impute a calculating consciousness to others, an ‘interest 
begotten prejudice’5 may prevent us from seeing it at work within ourselves. Paradoxically, the 
utilitarian consciousness that we need to overcome our prejudices is the very consciousness that 
prejudice prevents us from attaining. Interest begotten prejudice, as Bentham defined it, is a personal 
bias in favour of sectional or ‘sinister’ interests, of the kind that is expressed in an allegiance to common 
sense notions of virtue. Prejudice is thus an obstacle to the more general ‘reformation in the moral’6 that 
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Bentham proposed in A Fragment on Government. The effectiveness of government is thus ‘a matter of 
fact that depends upon experience, and is to be collected by observation.’ 7
l     1  Baumgardt, David, Bentham and the Ethics of Today (Princeton NJ, Princeton University 
Press, 1952) (...)
l     2  See Bentham, Jeremy, The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham 
edited by a f (...)
l     3  See Stolzenberg, Nomi Maya, ‘Bentham’s Theory of Fictions - a “Curious Double Language”’ 
Cardozo S (...)
l     4  Bentham, Jeremy, ‘Of Laws in General’, University College London Bentham Manuscripts, 
Box 70, Foli (...)
l     5   See ‘Interest Begotten Prejudice’ in The Book of Fallacies, Bowring II, pp. 477-8
l     6  Bentham, Jeremy, A Fragment on Government in A Comment on the Commentaries and A 
Fragment on Gover (...)
l     7  Bentham, J., A Comment on the Commentaries, p. 28
l     8  House of Commons, Report from Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures together with 
the minutes (...)
l     9  See Romans, Mervyn, ‘An Analysis of the Political Complexion of the 1835/6 Select 
Committee on Art (...)
2This article is primarily concerned with using Bentham’s comments on governance, ethics and public 
taste as a framework with which to analyse the application of utilitarianism to questions of public taste 
and public pedagogy in Britain in the mid-1830s, in a project for ‘the education of the eyes of the people 
by our own Government’8 initiated by Benthamites and Philosophical Radicals including John Bowring, 
Edwin Chadwick, Joseph Hume, George Grote, John Arthur Roebuck, Edward Strutt and Henry 
Warburton, all of whom were appointed to the Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures in 18359. 
 My analysis of this historical period is linked to more recent debates on ethics, pedagogy and public 
policy, through a discussion of Martha Nussbaum’s criticisms of utilitarianism and her promotion of 
‘moral imagination’ in Poetic Justice. Nussbaum’s book showed that the prospect of overcoming 
‘interest begotten prejudice’ in key debates on public policy had not improved significantly by the end 
of the twentieth century. I will also refer briefly to more recent debates on the relationship of taste to 
public policy, centred around the ‘libertarian paternalism’ and ‘choice architecture’ of Richard H. Thaler 
and Cass R. Sunstein, that employs the idea of using minor changes in the environment to ‘nudge’ 
individuals towards pre-determined ethical choices.  Although it might appear utilitarian in some ways, 
‘nudge theory’ places us at the opposite pole from Bentham’s ethics. ‘Nudging’ acts ‘under the radar’ of 
personal prejudice, and is determined by the moral issue of whether or not to intervene within the 
domain of personal taste and individual autonomy. Bentham, in contrast, argues that if sovereign power 
can make rational and logical choices about how to intervene, it will have thereby settled the ethical 
question of whether to intervene or not. 
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3My discussion of the problems attending Bentham’s wish to set ‘prejudice apart’ in discussions of 
taste, is undertaken with specific reference to the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s emphasis on the 
importance of what he termed ‘the utilitarian conversion’ in ethics, in his Seminar VII of 1959/60. 
 Lacan’s praise for Bentham and the “Theory of Fictions’ demonstrates some insight into the importance 
of Bentham’s ethics, while misunderstanding some of its most important features.  I argue that 
Bentham’s treatment of fact, rather than fictions, gives us a more precise route to the place of the 
unconscious in Bentham’s thought, as well as a better understanding of a utilitarian consciousness of 
taste. 
2: Taste as Fact
4In his writing on ‘the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’ of 1780-2, Jeremy 
Bentham asserted that changing the taste of a nation may be done either on the whim of an individual 
ruler, or in the name of utility. In the former case, it will produce a great deal of unnecessary pain in the 
cause of one person’s pleasure or displeasure. In the latter case, a new law of public taste can only be 
valid if submitted to an analysis of its costs and benefits. Custom and prejudice can only be countered 
with arguments for necessity, and judgments of what is good for the public must be founded on the facts 
of public interest, not the whims of a sovereign.  It is crucial to note that the principles of utility that 
Bentham applied to sovereign power also applied to individuals and communities, with their entrenched 
prejudices and time-honoured customs.  One consequence of this is that Bentham, whether he intended 
to or not, left the way open for new inventions of taste based on the alignment of tastes and reasons. He 
rejected the idea that the moral problem of laws of taste is that they intervene arbitrarily on established 
customs and practices ‘for what act or what habit is it that a law can be made against, and that might not 
be the act of the nation in general were it not for the law?’10 There can be no arguments against entirely 
new inventions of taste, which are correlated with a variety of contingent reasons, rather than a 
culturally limited number of local agreements that constitute the fabric of custom and habit. If tastes are 
laws, and laws are a coded assemblage of signs, this also undermines the whims of the legislator: 
l     10  Bentham, Jeremy, ‘Influence of Time and Place’, University College London Bentham 
Manuscripts, Box (...)
l     11  Bentham, Jeremy, ‘Rules Respecting the Method of Transplanting Laws’, University College 
London Be (...)
If my taste is a sufficient reason for me, an opposite taste may be as sufficient a reason for another. The 
emperor who would proscribe one letter of the alphabet, should recollect that his successor may 
determine to restore it: Queen Elizabeth, who was so anxious about the dress of the clergy, should have 
remembered that it might as easily be allowed in the following reign.11
l     12  Bentham, J., ‘Rules Respecting the Method of Transplanting Laws’, Box 88a, Folio 23a 
(1780-2)
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5While this might seem to be a simple appeal to the age-old principle of chacun à son goût, it is more a 
matter of ‘each to his own context’. In a footnote to this text, Bentham employs the anecdote of a 
surgeon who capriciously removes the remaining healthy finger on a damaged hand because ‘if this little 
finger had been left it would have looked ridiculous - This anecdote may serve as an apology for many 
operators in legislation.’12 In this anecdote, the maintenance of conventions of taste in an aesthetic 
encounter, is preferred to the unfamiliar ‘look’ produced by a utilitarian calculus.  Conversely, a 
Benthamite dismissal of the surgeon’s caprice would simultaneously dismiss the aesthetic ‘look’. It 
would allow hands with five, one or no fingers to exist in the field of vision, to be read as the specific 
products of contingent circumstances.
6It is also important to note that the image of a ruler dismissing a letter of the alphabet on a whim, only 
to have it replaced by someone else, emphasizes that taste is not simply a personal choice, but also exists 
as a contingent statement within a signifying system. Paradoxically, it is the level of understanding 
embodied in the complexity of this signifying system, that offers the shortest route from sovereign 
power to public utility, whereas the path from personal whim to public utility is made impassible by 
prejudice. However, the acceptance of this system for tempering desire by judgment, displaces the 
automatic identification of ‘sovereign’ individuals with their tastes, and instead offers a network of 
reasons unfolding in time and across space. Further, the ‘laissez-faire’ issue of whether sovereign power 
should or should not intervene in the social field, is conditioned by the idea that if a ruler can correctly 
discern how to intervene within the fabric of custom and practice, he will have thereby settled the ethical 
question of whether to intervene or not:
l     13  Bentham, J., ‘Influence of Time and Place’, Box 88a, Folio 27 (1780-2)
Peter the Great made a law obliging the Russians to cut off their beards and wear their clothes short like 
Europeans . . . The measure says Montesquieu afterwards was tyrannical: the change which he wanted to 
bring about he should have effected not by making a law but by setting an example. In the making of 
this law his object was either to gratify his own taste merely . . . by putting the people/men into a dress 
he liked to see instead of one he did not like to see, or it was to polish them, that is to bring the national 
character as near as he could to the European which he looked upon as better calculated to make them 
happy . . . Could he have effected the desired change of character without effecting this change in dress? 
could he have effected the change in dress merely by dressing himself as he wished to see his subjects 
dress, or by other measures less coercive than this law? . . . In all such matters . . . the cautious 
Statesman will avoid the tone of peremptoriness and decision: his conclusions will always in the final 
instance be hypothetical. If such and such events are the likeliest to later place? But are they? this is a 
matter which ought to be stated as accompanied with the degree of uncertainty that belongs to it.13 
l     14   Bentham, Jeremy, The Rationale of Reward (London, John Hunt, 1825), p.208
l     15  Bentham, J., The Rationale of Reward, p.208
7On these principles, Bentham dismissed the notion of ‘true’ and ‘false’ taste: ‘It is only from custom 
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and prejudice that, in matters of taste, we speak of false and true.’14 In TheRationale of Reward, he 
nonetheless offers an ethical division in the realm of taste, based on the cognitive difference between 
fact and fallacy in our estimation of the good: ‘There is no taste that deserves the epithet good, unless it 
be the taste for such employments which, to the pleasure actually produced by them, conjoin some 
contingent or future utility; there is no taste which deserves to be characterized as bad, unless it be a 
taste for some occupation which has a mischievous tendency.’15
l     16  Dardenne, Emilie, ‘From Jeremy Bentham to Peter Singer’, Revue d’études benthamiennes 
[En ligne], (...)
l     17  Hazlitt, William, The Spirit of the Age, or Contemporary Portraits (Kendal, The Wordsworth 
Trust), (...)
l     18  Bentham, J., The Rationale of Reward, p. 206 
8This view also affords a particular perspective on what Emilie Dardenne has referred to as the 
‘impossibly demanding ethic’16 of utilitarianism, the ultima ratio philosophorum mentioned in Hazlitt’s 
essay on Bentham in The Spirit of the Age17.  Hazlitt had argued that the human mind is unable to 
embrace utilitarian consciousness, because ‘our moral sentiments are made up of sympathies and 
antipathies, of sense and imagination, of understanding and prejudice’ and that to think otherwise is 
against our nature.  Bentham, as I have shown, suggests that custom and prejudice are no more natural 
than utility, and can be approached from within the cognitive order of a utilitarian calculus.  The famous 
passage ‘Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and 
poetry.  If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either’18 from 
Bentham’s The Rationale of Reward, at once identifies the possibility of a utilitarian calculus of tastes, 
while hinting that all the difficulties of this calculus are presented by the naturalisation of prejudices, 
rather than by any inherent problems of the calculus itself. 
l     19  ‘Arts-Royal Academy’, Hansard, Vol. 29, 14 July 1835, cc 553-62
l     20  See the final Report from the Select Committee on Arts and their Connexion with 
Manufactures With (...)
9The practical difficulties of establishing a utilitarian calculus of taste, cluster around the central 
problem of setting ‘prejudice apart’ and establishing the principle that custom and prejudice are no more 
natural than utility.  As I will show in my concluding references to the ‘nudge’ theories of Sunstein and 
Thaler, this principle is no more accepted within public policy debates today than it was two centuries 
ago. Nonetheless, the comments on individual sovereignty, law and public taste that Bentham made 
between 1780-82, provide a framework for analyzing the efforts of the Benthamites and Philosophical 
Radicals who sat on the Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures of 1835/6, and others such as 
Henry Cole who followed in their wake, to find a formula for ‘the education of the eyes of the people by 
our own government’. The Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures was established on 14 July 
1835, when MPs John Bowring, Joseph Hume, William Warburton, Thomas Wyse and others, supported 
William Ewart’s motion ‘That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the best means of 
extending a knowledge of the Fine Arts, and of the Principles of Design among the people—especially 
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among the manufacturing population of the country; and also, to inquire into the constitution of the 
Royal Academy, and the effects produced by it.’19 Ewart’s motion was successful, and led to the 
establishment of the Select Committee, and the foundation of the first publicly funded art school, The 
School of Design, in 1837. This was the first time that a cultural institution (the Royal Academy of Arts) 
had been criticized, analysed and ‘decoded’ using criteria of political economic reasoning and public 
utility, and recoded in a new, publicly funded art institution (The School of Design) directed to the 
enhancement of public taste in the cause of liberalism and free trade.20
l     21  ‘National Education’, Hansard, Vol. 20, 30 July 1833, cc 139-74
10Ewart and Bowring were the mainstays of this Committee; both were included in an imaginary 
‘Radical Philosophical’ cabinet proposed by The Spectator in 1837, which also included George Grote, 
Joseph Hume, Edward Strutt and Henry Warburton, all of whom were initially appointed to the Select 
Committee on Arts and Manufactures. Another early appointee to the Committee was John Arthur 
Roebuck, who had argued for the admission of artisans to the planned National Gallery in 1834, and 
who, in a debate on ‘National Education’ in 1833, had linked the necessity of the education of the people 
with ‘such knowledge as would create a taste for art’21.  In 1837, the same year that the first publicly 
funded art school was established, Roebuck made a speech on the subject of democracy in Canada, that 
used Bentham’s notion of ‘interest begotten prejudice’ to describe the political bias that stood in the way 
of democratic reform:
l     22  ‘Canada’, Hansard, Vol. 37, 14 April 1837, cc 1209-90. See also Bentham, J., The Book of 
Fallacies (...)
it requires a powerful effort of the judgment - a superiority to established prejudices of feeling and 
thought, very rare in this or in any other country, to throw off our inbred respect for the House of 
Parliament; and to see that what has been taught to us in our cradle and in our youth are the phantoms of 
a misdirected imagination - the lusty offspring of what Bentham called “an interest-begotten 
prejudice”.22
l     23  Arts-Royal Academy’, Hansard, cc 555-6
11When the Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures was formed in 1835, William Ewart made it 
clear that the reason for the unusually large number of MPs appointed to it, was ‘To have as many 
practical and professional Gentlemen on the Committee’23 as possible, aiming to reduce any inherent 
bias against reform.  The larger issue of the relation of interest begotten prejudice to the specific 
problems of ‘the education of the eyes of the people’ can be inferred from a satire on the democratic 
ambitions of the Philosophical Radicals by Albany Fonblanque in the Examiner in 1838.  Fonblanque 
compared the attitudes of the Philosophical Radicals towards the general populace to that of an artist 
engaged in painting lions, who had visited the menagerie in order to see one for the first time:
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l     24  Albany Fonblanque in the Examiner Dec 16 1838, quoted in Hamburger, Joseph, Intellectuals 
in Polit (...)
to see in the flesh the quadruped he had spent his days in painting . . . and, in answer to his eager 
inquiries for the lions, when the noble beasts were shown to him he flew into a violent passion, charged 
the keeper with cheating the public, and insisted the lions were no lions, for, said he, “I have been 
painting lions all my life, and should know pretty well what they are like.”24
l     25  See the arguments of Thomas Wyse in support of William Ewart’s proposal for a Select 
Committee on (...)
12In Fonblanque’s view, the Philosophical Radicals, in the name of democracy, had developed an 
unnatural vision that could not be understood by anyone else. However, it is also significant that, in 
Fonblanque’s satire, the mistake of the Philosophical Radicals is to assume that they can represent 
something without encountering it. In the view of Philosophical Radicals, on the other hand, ‘ways of 
seeing’ were constructed from cultivated forms of aesthetic encounter from which the majority of the 
population were excluded.25
l     26  Chadwick, Edwin, review of ‘Report from the Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures 
1836’, The L (...)
l     27  Chadwick, E., The London and Westminster Review, p. 131
l     28  H.C. [Henry Cole] ‘Committees of the House of Commons – Administration by Large 
Numbers’, The Lond (...)
l     29  See ‘Henry Cole Diaries 1822-1882’, a transcript compiled by Elizabeth Bonython, (London, 
Victoria (...)
l     30  Austin, John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. W. E. Rumble (Cambridge, 
Cambridge Uni (...)
l     31  ‘Henry Cole Diaries 1822-1882’, entry for 29 Jan 1852: ‘Saw Sir C Trevelyan congratulated 
me on su (...)
13In the same year as Fonblanque’s satire in the Examiner, Edwin Chadwick delivered an assessment of 
the efforts of the Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures in The London and Westminster 
Review26, which illustrated some of the intellectual problems involved in refuting Fonblanque’s 
criticisms. While referring to the ‘broad and Philosophical’ view the Committee had brought to the 
relation of art, social science and commerce, Chadwick saw this simply in terms of an alliance between 
the cultivation of a correct taste and an improvement in the position of British manufacturers in foreign 
markets. He argued that taste had been proved to belong to the province of political economy, and that 
the creation of tastes was a legitimate branch of commercial industry. Chadwick could be said to be 
following Bentham’s lead somewhat in opposing national prejudices of taste to international commercial 
success, and positioning the public funding of art education as the outcome of a rational experiment or 
hypothesis in the education of taste.  However, Chadwick’s notion of taste prejudices is based on crude 
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divisions of class (‘‘the selfish and exclusive classes, who have endeavored to keep back the industrious 
classes from a knowledge of the principles and refinements of taste, have in reality “picked their own 
pockets”’27).  Chadwick does not address the primary political problem that William Ewart had forseen 
in his choice of ‘practical and professional gentlemen’ for the Select Committee on Arts and 
Manufactures, namely how to close the gap between sectarian prejudice and public interest in the 
formulation of new institutions of art and a general education in taste.  For Chadwick, the agency of the 
government in deciding on this new pedagogy of taste was simply to arbitrate in favour of the laboring 
classes.  Chadwick’s friend Henry Cole, the only person to actually propose new laws of taste in the 
name of utility, did so after having carefully analysed the composition of the Select Committee of Arts 
and Manufactures, with an eye to how the House of Commons could more clearly express its own 
meaning and perfect ‘the construction and language of its Acts.’28 In this regard, it is worth noting that 
Cole attended John Austin’s final series of lectures on ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Explained’ in 
January 1833, and read the lectures in their published form.29 In the third lecture of ‘The Province of 
Jurisprudence Explained’, Austin argues that definitions of what is good in culture are often made in 
defence of sectional and partial interests, and that what is required is an education in ‘indifferency’ and 
the principles of general utility30.  Austin further argues that it is the obstacles of prejudice and sinister 
interest placed in the way of the wider cultivation of ‘indifferency’ that is the true source of the apparent 
intellectual difficulty of utilitarian ethics.   The tenor of Austin’s lectures, and the context provided by 
Henry Cole’s friendship with the Mills, may give some indication as to why Cole’s later development of 
‘Principles of Taste’ in the Department of Practical Art, favoured correct principles of conduct, based on 
the identification of fallacies of taste. For Cole, the correspondence between persons and tastes had first 
to be read through a distinction between facts and fallacies of taste, which could be identified in 
manufactured objects.  However, there is an unresolved tension between ‘coded taste’ (an appeal to 
utilitarian consciousness) and ‘regulated taste’ (representations of utility) in Cole’s theories of design 
reform.  When Cole was appointed to ‘direct the Art of the Country’31 in 1852, and declared that a 
water jug with a pattern of water reeds designed by Richard Redgrave (his colleague in the Department 
of Practical Art) exemplified ‘Correct Principles of Taste’, he confused the contingent correlation of 
taste and reason (the unambiguously coded jug) with the creation of a set of fixed ‘reasons’ or rules (The 
Principles of Taste) that introduced the arbitrary whims of Cole as the current ‘Tsar’ of public taste. 
 Despite the emphasis on linguistic terms such as ‘The Grammar of Ornament’ in the Department of 
Practical Art, what Cole disregarded in his discourses on utility, was the mediating role of space, time 
and language in politics, that Bentham had identified in the image of the ruler who deletes one letter of 
the alphabet only to have it replaced by his successor. 
l     32  See Fielding, K.J., ‘Charles Dickens and the Department of Practical Art’ The Modern 
Language Revi (...)
14In following the vicissitudes of Cole’s efforts to reform public taste, an important point of reference is 
Hard Times, chapter two of which is devoted to Charles Dickens’s satire on the implausibility of 
utilitarian design reform, in which the anonymous ‘third gentleman’ who accompanies Mr Gradgrind in 
his schoolroom, is partly based on Henry Cole32. The third gentleman makes a speech to the children of 
Coketown:
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l     33  Dickens, C., Hard Times, p. 51
‘Why, then, you are not to see anywhere, what you don’t see in fact; you are not to have anywhere, what 
you don’t have in fact. What is called Taste, is only another name for Fact’. . ‘This is a new principle, a 
discovery, a great discovery,’ said the gentleman.33
15In a letter to Cole on 17 June 1854, Dickens made it clear that what he was satirizing was that, despite 
his moral intentions and his dedication to reason, Gradgrind goes too far in assuming that taste could be 
rendered as fact:
l     34  Letter from Charles Dickens to Henry Cole, reproduced in Frayling, Christopher, Henry Cole 
and the (...)
I often say to Mr Gradgrind that there is reason and a good intention in much that he does - in fact, in all 
that he does - but that he overdoes it.  Perhaps by dint of his going his way and my going mine, we shall 
meet at last at some halfway house where there are flowers on the carpets, and a little standing-room for 
Queen Mab’s chariot among the Steam Engines.34 
16 Here, Dickens’s common sense assumptions about ‘overdoing it’, were established by comparing 
hard fact and imaginative fancy, suggesting a halfway house between them.  From Bentham’s point of 
view, however, Cole’s only problem would have been to what extent he might overcome custom and 
prejudice in matters of taste and establish taste as a matter of contingent reasons correlated with a 
multitude of forms. What Cole actually established, however, was a limited number of representations 
of utility in taste, thus making utility itself into a caprice - a halfway house to Bentham that was also a 
halfway house to Dickens. In the end, Cole’s regulated taste could only offer a means to control and 
administrate the aesthetic encounter, by employing representations of utility in the name of public 
education.  Bentham, by analysing individual tastes within a comparison and calculus of interests, 
questions the need for any aesthetic encounter at all. Nonetheless, some potential for a utilitarian 
consciousness of taste was present in Cole’s carefully coded definitions of the fallacies of commercially 
produced taste, and his engagement with taste across the entire social field, including everyday items 
such as wallpaper, gas burners and tea trays. 
3: The Unconscious
17If Henry Cole never found a satisfactory way to distinguish reason from prejudice in his analysis of 
taste, how is this to be accomplished?  In ‘rules respecting the method of transplanting laws’, Bentham 
had argued that the task of correctly discerning how to intervene in the domain of public taste fell to the 
legislator.  If the legislator chose correctly, personal prejudice and the inertia of custom would be 
eliminated, and public benefit would be the result. To do this, however, the legislator must circumvent 
personal whims by choosing not a particular option (a particular letter of the alphabet), but an entire 
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method (the utilitarian calculus) and its associated consciousness of space and time.  This dimension is 
the ‘intimate converse with the inhabitants of the Moon’ referred to In Hazlitt’s essay on Bentham, 
which Hazlitt saw as impossible because ‘our feelings evaporate in so large a space’35. Yet the gauntlet 
Bentham throws down is precisely that we should choose the utilitarian calculus itself, and take the 
consequences for our amour propre. Accordingly, Bentham positions a utilitarian calculus as something 
that is unconscious within everyday consciousness, rather than (as Hazlitt argues) being humanly 
impossible.  
l     35  Hazlitt, W., The Spirit of the Age, p. 94
l     36  In Bentham and the Ethics of Today, p. 379, David Baumgardt refers to remarks that Bentham 
makes i (...)
18Making this distinction between the unconscious and the impossible, requires particular attention to 
the place of fact in utilitarian ethics. Specifically, we must note the difference between Bentham’s use of 
the word ‘unconscious’ to indicate a simple ‘ignorance of the facts’ resulting from cognitive deficiency 
or a lack of transparency, and the deflection or ‘inhibition’36 of a utilitarian consciousness of fact by 
interest begotten prejudice.  Some light can be shed on this issue by referring to the particular inhibitions 
of J.S. Mill, who famously indicated ‘a blank in Bentham’s system’ of ethical judgment in the London 
and Westminster Review in 1838.  In his criticisms of Bentham, Mill introduced two different kinds of 
‘fact’ -‘facts in human life’ on the one hand, and ’worldly circumstances’ on the other:
l     37  Anonymous [John Stuart Mill] review of ‘The Works of Jeremy Bentham’, The London and 
Westminster R (...)
A moralist on Bentham’s principles may get as far as this, that we ought not to slay, burn or steal; but 
what will be his qualifications for regulating the nicer shades of human behaviour, or for laying down 
even the greater moralities as to those facts in human life which influence the depths of the character 
quite independently of any influence of worldly circumstances – such, for instance, as the sexual 
relations, or those of family in general . . . It is fortunate for the world that Bentham’s taste lay rather in 
the direction of jurisprudential than of ethical inquiry.37 
19In line with the throwaway comment on ‘Bentham’s taste’ in this passage, Mill also refers 
disapprovingly to Bentham’s single-minded application of a utilitarian moral calculus to all matters, 
including judgments of taste. In contrast, Mill identifies personal taste as an important index of moral 
character; taste is the mirror of human nature, and Bentham’s taste for jurisprudence tells us something 
about Bentham’s morals.  However, what Mill interprets as Bentham’s monomania, can also be read as 
an ethical distinction between fact and fallacy, as applied to judgments of taste. While Bentham did 
employ processual distinctions within an ethical consciousness in which ‘facts conjectured’ were 
developed from ‘facts experienced’, this consciousness did not rely on the distinction between human 
and worldly facts that was employed by J. S. Mill. In his discussion of the subjects of law in Of Laws in 
General, for example, Bentham initially makes a primary distinction between things, which have 
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physical properties, and ‘persons’ that also possess faculties of sensation, perception and volition. He 
then adds a note to indicate that this definition of a ‘person’ actually derives from the fundamental 
distinction between animate cognition and its absence:
l     38  Bentham, Jeremy, Of Laws in General, ed. H.L.A Hart (University of London: Athlone Press 
1970) p.3 (...)
Of the inferior animals I omit for shortness’ sake to make any particular mention; in so far as their 
mental faculties are taken into the account, they stand upon a footing with persons; in as far as they are 
not taken into the account, they stand on a footing with inanimate things.38
20Accordingly, Bentham’s social psychology, as it was presented by Peregrine Bingham in the 
treatment of ‘interest begotten prejudice’ in The Book of Fallacies, is not concerned with the formation 
and development of a character, so much as the fallacies that are instituted by adopting one. Bentham 
claims that while it is in our personal interest to know what motivates others, it is in our social interest 
not to  acknowledge our own motivations.  The unconscious aspects of the person are a product of the 
formation of character and identity within the social field, and the consequent division of our virtuous 
self-image from the corrupt web of worldly circumstances in which we see others, but not ourselves, as 
being enmeshed:
l     39  Bentham, J., The Book of Fallacies, Bowring II, p. 477-8
Not unfrequently, as between two persons living together in a state of intimacy, either or each may 
possess a more correct and complete view of the motives by which the mind of the other, than of those 
by which his own mind, is governed.39
l     40  Bentham, J., The Book of Fallacies, Bowring II, p. 477-8
21We are utilitarians with our partners and neighbours, but not with ourselves.  Our personal 
motivations are repellent, and cannot be openly defended; publicly asserted and commonly recognized 
virtues obscure them: ‘Why undeceive himself, and substitute a whole truth, that would mortify him, for 
a half truth that flatters him?’40 It is important to note that ‘the whole truth’ referred to here has nothing 
to do with an accommodation to the iron circumstances of the world. Rather, it is concerned with the 
acceptance of a rational evaluation or comparison of our own motivations and interests and those of 
others. In this case, a primary distinction between animate cognition and its absence, rather than a 
problem of correspondence between mind and world, is the basis of our consciousness of others and of 
ourselves.  This consciousness will inevitably produce an ethical distinction between the facts of 
experienced pleasure and the fallacies of public prejudice. A limited insight into the value of this kind of 
utilitarian consciousness was provided by the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan in his discussion of 
Bentham’s ethics in his Seminar VII of 1959/60:
l     41   Lacan, Jacques, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Livre VII L’Éthique de la Psychanalyse 
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1959-1960, (...)
l     42  Lacan, Jacques, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book VII, ed. (...)
I began my lecture this year with the onerous topic of the utilitarians, but the utilitarians are quite right. 
[ont tout à fait raison41] They are countered with something which makes the task of countering them 
much more difficult, with a sentence such as ‘But Mr Bentham, my good is not the same as another’s 
good, and your principle of the greatest good for the greatest number comes up against the demands of 
my egoism.” But it’s not true.  My egoism is content with a certain altruism, altruism of the kind that is 
situated at the level of the useful. And it even becomes the pretext by means of which I can avoid taking 
up the problem of the evil I desire, and that my neighbor desires also.42
22Here, Lacan’s analysis demonstrates the opportunities and pitfalls of an intuitive approach to 
Bentham’s ethics in the context of a seminar, the publication of which has also produced disputes over 
accurate transcription and translation. On the one hand, Lacan can be credited with understanding that an 
apparent contradiction between ‘egoism’ and the ‘the greatest good of the greatest number’ does not 
constitute an effective argument against Bentham.  On the other hand, in the struggle between desire and 
altruism, altruism is situated ‘at the level of the useful’ (‘au niveau de l’utile’) which equates utility with 
instrumentalism, and ignores Bentham’s distinction between the facts of interest and the fallacies of 
altruism. This may be because Lacan, in his introduction of Bentham and utility at the beginning of 
Seminar VII, shows a preference for a distinction of fiction and reality, and ignores the alliance of fact 
and fiction against fallacy in Bentham’s moral calculus:
l     43  De Kesel, Marc, Eros and Ethics: Reading Lacan’s Seminar VII, trans. Sigi Jöttkandt, (New 
York, SU (...)
It is in the dialectical relation of language and the real that Bentham tried to give place to the real good, i.
e., to the pleasure which (as we will see) he ascribes a function that differs radically from what Aristotle 
meant by this. And in his emphasis on the opposition between fiction and reality, I will declare, lies the 
break inaugurated by the Freudian experience.43
l     44  Lacan, J., Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Livre VII, p. 22
l     45  Lacan, J., The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 12
23The translation reproduced here is by Marc De Kesel, who uses it to question Jacques-Alain Miller’s 
treatment of the same passage in the official edition of Seminar VII, where Miller offers the following: 
‘Bentham’s effort is located in the dialectic of the relationship of language to the real so as to situate the 
good . . . on the side of the real [du côte du réel44].’45It can also be argued that De Kesel and Miller are 
both, in slightly different ways, faithful to Lacan’s misreading of Bentham.  De Kesel makes some good 
observations on the distinction between Bentham’s ethics of happiness and the Aristotelian emphasis on 
happiness ‘as a natural inclination to let man know he is on the right path towards his ontological 
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realization.’  However, De Kesel then maps this opposition between virtue ethical naturalism and 
Benthamite artifice, onto a separate distinction between fiction and reality:
l     46  De Kesel, M., Eros and Ethics, p. 62
What utilitarianism makes into a such an irreversible milestone in our modern moral history is thus not 
the maxim of “the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people,” but the claim that happiness 
and the good are “fictitious” (i.e., purely signifiers).46
24The opposition between fiction and reality that de Kesel uses here, shrinks utilitarianism back towards 
a problem of correspondence between mind and world.   The opposition of fact and fallacy, on the other 
hand, establishes a different ethical consciousness, in which a complex and ‘artificial’ web of 
signification that is the basis of a utilitarian calculus, is offered as the moral alternative to a detour into 
the problem of a correspondence between mind and world.  
l     47  This misreading has been compounded by Slavoj Žižek, who in his Tarrying with the 
Negative: Kant, (...)
25Further, it is this detour into the correspondence between mind and world, that is naturalised in the 
personal drama of an aesthetic encounter. In Lacan’s ethics seminar, despite his praise for the ‘utilitarian 
conversion’, aesthetics is presented, contradictorily, both as a detour on the way to desire and as the 
straightest route towards it. Lacan’s analysis of utilitarianism remains unresolved, because it is grounded 
in the opposition between fiction and reality47. Bentham’s approach is more direct - a consciousness of 
facts indicates a harmony of will and understanding that promotes the efficiency of desire; fallacies, 
such as those promoted by critics of taste, can only cloud our perception of our desires. Nonetheless, 
Lacan’s description of Freudian sublimation as a way of choosing ‘everything’ (the network of 
signifiers) in the very act of choosing something (a particular object) is closer to the distinction of fact 
and fallacy than it is to the opposition of fiction and reality. It also relates to Bentham’s implication, in 
‘Rules Respecting the Method of Transplanting Laws’, that we must choose the whole alphabet, rather 
than simply choosing the particular letter that marks our personal contribution, in order to generate 
complete freedom in the calculation of possibilities and hypotheses.  Lacan expresses this idea in the 
following way:
l     48  Lacan, J., The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 295
It is in the signifier and insofar as the subject articulates a signifying chain that he comes up against the 
fact that he may disappear from the chain of what he is. 48
26At the end of his seminar on ethics, Lacan concludes that the important thing is not to decide whether 
a man is good or bad, but to know what the consequences will be when he has ‘chosen everything’ by 
aligning his actions with the field of signification.  The natural limits of ethics in Aristotle, which are the 
limits of the self in its relation to the world, are here replaced by the framing of ethical judgments in 
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terms of logic and language that has been enabled by ‘la conversion utilitariste’. The necessity of this 
‘connversion’ is why, as I have argued, Bentham positions a utilitarian calculus as something that is 
unconscious within everyday consciousness, rather than (as Hazlitt claims) being humanly impossible. 
 In a commentary on Hazlitt’s essay on Bentham, Tim Milnes has pointed out that in aligning common 
sense with aesthetic performance, Hazlitt shows himself to be promoting obscurity within a conventional 
epistemological framework:
l     49  Milnes, Tim,  “Darkening Knowledge’ : Hazlitt and Bentham on the Limits of Empiricism’ in 
Metaphys (...)
The irony within Hazlitt’s irony in ‘Bentham’ and ‘On People of Sense’, then, is that his critique of 
Bentham’s supposedly thin, non-performative prose take the form of a performance that, rather than 
dispensing with the notion of a ‘correspondence’ between mind and world, reinscribes this 
correspondence in the crepuscular grounds of common sense.49
27Following the death of Hazlitt in 1830 and Bentham in 1832, the challenge for the members of the 
Select Committee on Arts and Manufactures, and their legatee Henry Cole, was to establish public taste 
and public education on something other than ‘the crepuscular grounds of common sense’.  That this 
project failed, and that all of this activity by the radical thinkers at the Board of Trade in the 1830s 
resulted in nothing more than some attempts to establish government regulation of the aesthetic 
encounter, should not be a reason for ignoring their efforts. Where Hazlitt argued that transcending 
common sense and common prejudice was impossible, Bentham claimed that it was necessary, in order 
that those in power could have the expanded temporal and spatial framework of the utilitarian calculus at 
their disposal, as well as the ability to construct effective hypotheses on social and cultural change.  The 
concluding section of this article looks at some of the conditions of more recent debate on the 
relationship of utilitarianism and public policy, to ask whether these possibilities have been realized in 
the present. 
4: Conclusion - the task of the legislator
28In ‘Rules Respecting the Method of Transplanting Laws’, Bentham makes it clear that the task of the 
legislator on public taste is to align himself with an ‘alphabet’ or sequence of tastes, in order to make an 
ethical choice within the terms of a utilitarian consciousness.  In contrast, the ruler who chooses on a 
whim chooses blindly, with no awareness of the sequence in which he is unconsciously enmeshed, or the 
sinister interests that may be affecting his judgment. Utilitarian consciousness may be unconscious 
within personal prejudices of taste, but this does not mean that a utilitarian consciousness of taste is 
impossible.  However, this consciousness occupies an unusual position within the debates on free trade 
and laissez-faire economics that determined the efforts of the Select Committee on Arts and 
Manufactures in the mid-1830s. It sits athwart the gap between Adam Smith’s virtue ethical notion of 
happiness as the sign of human self-realisation in the world of goods, and Bentham’s definition of 
happiness according to the distinction between animate cognition and its absence, which was caricatured 
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in J. S. Mill’s scathing reference to the ‘pig satisfied’50. It can be argued that for Bentham, the initiation 
of laissez-faire paradoxically depends on a decision which is made in favour of the utilitarian calculus, 
and against prejudice and inertia.  This decision is difficult to make, or even to understand, in a situation 
where virtue ethics is privileged over utility, and the relation of mind and world shapes our identity and 
our common sense views on social and cultural issues. An example of this prejudice at work in recent 
debates on political economy and public policy can be found in Martha Nussbaum’s references, in her 
book Poetic Justice, to Dickens’s criticisms of utilitarianism in Hard Times.  In Poetic Justice, 
Nussbaum argues that Hard Times is an example of how great literature can be employed to promote the 
moral imagination (a notion that Nussbaum adapts from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments) 
against what she sees as the ‘refusal of sympathy’ and anti-humanism in aspects of utilitarian thought. In 
pursuing her argument, Nussbaum employs a version of Hazlitt’s criticism of utilitarianism, namely that 
utilitarianism is a theory that is revealed to be implausible, impossible or bizarre when applied to ethical 
practice in everyday life or the inner life of individuals, and that what is lacking in Bentham is a ‘fuller 
vision of persons’51:
l     50  Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism (London, Longmans, Green and Reader 1871), p.14
l     51  Nussbaum, Martha, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston, 
Beacon Press 1 (...)
l     52  Nussbaum, M., Poetic Justice, p.17
The utilitarian picture of human beings and of rationality is familiar enough in theory.  What makes the 
utilitarian norm appear so odd to the reader of Dicken’s novel is that it is taken seriously all the way 
down, so to speak: understood not just as a way of writing up reports, but as a way of dealing with 
people in daily encounters; not just as a way of doing economics, but as a way of defining a horse or 
talking to a child; not just as a way of being professionally respectable, but as a commitment that 
determines the whole content of one’s personal and social life. But since this norm does in fact claim to 
be a standard of rationality, and not just a handy professional tool, and since, if it really is a norm, it also 
seems fair to ask people to abide by it consistently, it also seems perfectly fair to ask what people who 
really and thoroughly saw the world in the way this norm recommends would be like.52
29In one sense, Nussbaum is perfectly correct - the ‘strangeness’ of utilitarian ethics must be accounted 
for.  On the other hand, while accepting that Hard Times is satirical fiction, she is inclined to accept 
Dickens’s opposition of fact and fancy as the foundation of her arguments against utilitarianism. We can 
also take up Nussbaum’s challenge to take utilitarianism seriously ‘all the way down’ and, moving away 
from the prevarications of Henry Cole, ask ‘what is the ‘seeing in fact’ that the third gentleman refers to 
in Hard Times?’ To do this one would also have ask what the status of ‘fact’ is within utilitarian ethics, 
rather than within the novels of Charles Dickens.  As I have argued, ‘seeing in fact’ would be the 
shortest route to sense afforded by an avoidance of those aesthetic encounters on which the ‘noble 
exemplars’ of virtue ethics rely.   A model of ‘seeing in fact’ is offered in Bentham’s description of the 
public gymnasium in his Deontology:
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l     53  Bentham, Jeremy, Deontology, ed. John Bowring (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, 
Green and Longm (...)
A whole kingdom, the great globe itself, will become a gymnasium, in which every man exercises 
himself before the eyes of every other man. Every gesture, every turn of limb or feature, in those whose 
motions have a visible influence on the general happiness, will be noticed and marked down. The 
constitution of the human mind being opened by degrees, the labyrinth is explored, a clue is found out 
for it. That clue is the influence of interest; of interest, not in that partial and sordid sense in which it is 
the tyrant of sordid souls, but in the enlarged and beneficent sense in which it is the common master of 
all spirits, and especially of the enlightened. It is put into the hands of every man.53
l     54  Bentham, Jeremy, Offences Against Oneself, available at: http://www.columbia. [Accessed 14 
Februar (...)
l     55  Nussbaum, M., Poetic Justice, p.17
30‘Seeing in fact’ would also depend on a consciousness in which custom and prejudice are no more 
natural than utility. When Bentham writes on ‘Offences Against Oneself’, for example, he paradoxically 
refers to his efforts to find sufficient grounds for prejudice, in the face of a utilitarian calculus that can 
discover none54. In this regard, and with reference to Bentham’s comments in The Book of Fallacies, is 
worth contrasting Bentham’s struggle to accept the claims of prejudice against those of a calculus of 
sexual pleasure, with the ease with which Martha Nussbaum infers a calculating consciousness to 
Richard Posner’s ‘Gradgrindian account of sexual choices’55 in his Sex and Reason, while defending an 
ethics of character. Nussbaum offers Posner’s text as proof that Gradgrindism actually exists as an 
element of public policy; in other words she is claiming that the opposition between fact and fancy she 
has incarnated in Dickens is ‘real’.  From the correlationist perspective offered by virtue ethics, 
utilitarianism is a theory of choice whose implications are unethical. When Bentham writes about 
‘Offences Against Oneself’, on the other hand, he makes it clear that the ethical choice is between fact 
and fallacy, or in other words between utilitarianism and prejudice. 
l     56  Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein, Cass R., Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth 
and Happ (...)
l     57  Thaler, R. H., and Sunstein, C. R., Nudge, p.9
31Nussbaum’s preference for ‘fancy’ and the aesthetic encounter, shows a bias in favour of virtue ethics 
over utilitarianism in public policy debates that has continued into the present.  The current popularity of 
the ‘nudge’ theories of Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein with governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic, shows that current thinking on the relation of government agency to individual tastes is divided 
against itself56.  ‘Nudging’ ‘libertarian paternalism’ and ‘choice architecture’ favour the introduction of 
small changes in the design of human environments that enable individuals to promote public good 
without being aware of it. While ‘nudge’ might seem to be an example of ‘indirect legislation’ by 
Bentham’s definition of the term, it acts with inertia and prejudice rather than against them. Thaler and 
Sunstein advise us that we should ‘never underestimate the power of inertia. Second, that power can be 
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harnessed.  If private companies or public officials think that one policy produces better outcomes, they 
can greatly influence the outcome by choosing it as the default.’57  As happened with Henry Cole’s 
efforts with design reform and public pedagogy in the nineteenth century, ‘nudgism’ can do no more 
than attempt to regulate our tastes, while keeping the signifying system of ‘choice architecture’ at an 
unconscious level.  Sunstein and Thaler’s theories are also directed towards the limitation of choices and 
tastes according to pre-determined ethical conventions. In contrast, Bentham’s ‘alphabet’ of tastes used 
logic and language to propose a reform of ethics.  This is achieved by a decision in favour of the 
utilitarian calculus, or to use Sunstein and Thaler’s terms, a choice in favour of ‘choice architecture’ 
itself.
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